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NOTE
CRIMINAL LAW-THE

PRINCIPLE OF HARM AND ITS APPLICATION
TO LAWS CRIMINALIZING PROSTITUTION
INTRODUCTION

The past decade has witnessed a renascence of interest in
criminal justice. As the rights of an accused have received more
intense judicial scrutiny, multitudinous protections have been
prescribed and delineated' with the concomitant establishment of
unprecedented protections against abuse of procedure. Nor has
the expansion of rights stopped at the prison gates. More and
more constitutional claims of prisoners are being recognized,' and
the case law in the field of corrections is expanding at a prolific
rate. From arrest through incarceration, the criminal process is
now closely monitored by the courts.'
The failure of the courts is that their monitoring of the criminal process begins so late-that it remains dormant until a
confrontation has arisen between the state and a citizen. The
requisite attention is not given to the substantive criminal law
which determines, by delineating what conduct is and is not
criminal, what confrontations can legitimately be created by the
system and its agents. Thus what should be the most basic and
'E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 334 U.S. 436
(1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'The following areas are representative of those in which post-convicton claims are
being sustained by the courts.
Limitations upon censorship of mail: Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir.
1972); Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1971); Palmigiano v. Travisono,
317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
Access to the press: Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971); Burnham v.
Oswald, 342 F. Supp. 880 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).
Right to congregational worship: Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971);
Theriault v. Carlson, 339 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
Conditions of confinement: Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972); Holt v.
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
Due process protections in disciplinary hearings: Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.
Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Nolan v. Scafati, 306 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1969).
Rights upon revocaton of parole or probation: Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 93 S. Ct. 1756
(1973).
'For a discussion of the effectiveness of judicial control over prearrest confrontations
which occur within the context of police field interrogation see Tiffany, The Fourth
Amendment and Police-Citizen Confrontations,60 J. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 442 (1969).
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preeminent constitutional question-"When is governmental intrusion into the private lives of citizens warranted?"-is being
judicially ignored. The courts should be under a continuing duty
to ask and to attempt to answer this fundamental question and,
in so doing, to impose limits on the use of the criminal sanction.
But with few exceptions4 the United States Supreme Court has
been unwilling to rule on the constitutionality of the substance,
and not merely the procedure, of the criminal law.
The thesis of this note is that the fourteenth amendment,
through its prohibition against arbitrary deprivations of life, liberty, and property, imposes not only procedural but also substantive limitations on the criminal justice system; that there are
basic criteria to which the courts should look in evaluating the
constitutionality of the substance of the criminal law; and that
these criteria must be satisfied before conduct can be declared
criminal and the machinery of the criminal process thereby set
in motion. Specifically, conduct which does not meet the criterion
of legal harm should not be declared criminal. The principle of
legal harm will be developed, its elements set forth, and the
validity of criminalization of prostitution evaluated in light of
this principle.
The crime of prostitution is an appropriate subject for a
harm analysis for several reasons. Not only has "[t]he debate
over criminal laws forbidding certain varieties of sexual conduct
. . . become the locus classicus of modern interest in the limits
of criminal law," 5 but also the opponents of prostitution assert
with great vigor that prostitution causes several harms. But what
makes prostitution particularly apropos is that although recently
challenges to the constitutionality of prostitution laws have been
brought' and sustained in several jurisdictions,' the constitu'In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a provision which made it a crime "to be addicted to the use of narcotics." Id. at
660. However, in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), the Court refused to extend the
Robinson rationale and upheld a provision which made it a crime to "get drunk or be
found in a state of intoxication in any public place .... " Id. at 517. The Court clarified
its holding in Robinson by stating that the crucial issue is whether or not "the accused
has committed some act .... " Id. at 533.
H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 301 (1968).
'Unsuccessful challenges have been brought in Maryland and Indiana. In Cherry v.
State, 18 Md. App. 252, 306 A.2d 634 (1973), where the male defendant had advertised in
the Washington Post for prostitutes to entertain his clients under the guise of advertising
a receptionist position, the court rejected overbreadth, vagueness, and freedom of speech
arguments and sustained the constitutionality of MD.ANN. CODE art. 27 § 15(e) (1957)
which prohibited solicitation for the purposes of prositution. In Wilson v. State, 278

THE PRINCIPLE OF HARM

tional issues thus far raised-equal protection, 8 right to privacy, 9
and freedom of speech' 0-fail to go to the heart of the constitutional infirmities which beset laws criminalizing prostitution.
These arguments should be reserved for attacking regulationof,
and not criminal prohibition of, prostitution."
After a brief survey of the scope, function, and inadequacies
of each theory which has been utilized in framing constitutional
challenges to prostitution laws, the principle of harm, which will
be shown to address the critical constitutional defect of laws
criminalizing prostitution, will be applied to the harms most frequently alleged to be caused by prostitution. This analysis will
show that criminalization of prostitution should not constitutionally be allowed to stand.
I. PRESENT CHALLENGES
A. Equal Protection
By far the most successful argument asserted in attempts to
N.E.2d 569 (Ind. 1972), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972), the court rejected an equal
protection challenge to its facially discriminatory law. In Sumpter v. State, 14 CRiM. L.
REP. 2373 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1974), the court upheld a statute making it a crime for women
but not men to frequent or live in a house of ill fame. The court rejected arguments that
the statute violated the equal protection clause and the prohibitions against establishment of religion, suffered from unconstitutional vagueness, and imposed punishment for
a "status" rather than for criminal conduct.
7
Successful challenges have been brought in three jurisdictions. In State v. Fields, No.
72-4788 Cr. (3d Jud. Dist. Ct. Alas., June 27, 1973), the court held ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.40.210 (1970), criminalizing prostitution, invalid on its face under the equal protection clause and ALASKA STAT. § 11.40.230 (1970), criminalizing solicitation for prostitution,
discriminately enforced against females in contravention of the equal protection clause.
In United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972),
appeal docketed, No. 7042, D.C. Cir., Nov. 10, 1972 (abbreviated opinion reported in 41
U.S.L.W. 2298), the court held D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2701 (1967), criminalizing solicitation for prositution, invalid as an unconstitutional invasion of the defendants' rights of
privacy and freedom of speech. It furthermore found discriminatory enforcement of the
provision against female offenders constituted a denial of equal protection. In State v.
Woods, No. 443012 (Minneapolis Mun. Ct., Dec. 21, 1971), the court held MINNEAPOLIS
ORD. 870.10 invalid on its face under the equal protection clause and void for vagueness.
'Equal protection issues were raised in State v. Fields, No. 72-4788 Cr. (3d Jud. Dist.
Ct. Alas., June 27, 1973), United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super.
Ct., Nov. 3, 1972), Wilson v. State, 278 N.E.2d 569 (Ind. 1972), and State v. Woods, No.
443012 (Minneapolis Mun. Ct., Dec. 21, 1971).
'Right of privacy issues were raised in State v. Fields, No. 72-4788 Cr. (3d Jud. Dist.
Ct. Alas., June 27, 1973); and United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C.
Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972).
"Freedom of speech issues were raised in Cherry v. State, 18 Md. App. 252, 306 A.2d
634 (1973); United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3,
1973).
"Regulation of prostitution consists of legalization by the state accompanied by reten-
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invalidate prostitution laws has been that the challenged law in
some manner contravenes the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Three courts have found that a challenged prostitution law treated those similarly situated differently and thus worked a denial of equal protection. Such disparate treatment generally results in one of two ways: (1) a statute
may be discriminatory on its face by defining prostitution as an
offense by a female, thereby precluding prosecution of male prostitutes; 3 or (2) a statute neutral on its face may be discriminately
enforced against female prostitutes. 4
While all the courts which have struck down contested prostitution laws have done so either totally or partially on equal
protection grounds, the limitation of equal protection challenges
should be recognized. The equal protection clause provides no
basis for a prohibition of all laws which criminalize prostitution,
but only a basis for ensuring that laws criminalizing prostitution
are drafted and enforced without discrimination.
B. Right of Privacy
Prostitution laws are also being challenged as representing
an infringement of the right of privacy, although to date only one
court has recognized the applicability of this argument to prostition of authority to license, tax, require periodic health inspections, and, in the case of
houses of prostitution, to regulate the hours of operaton. NEV. REV. STAT. § 244.345(8)
(1971) legalizes prostitution in counties with populations under 200,000 and confers upon
those counties authority to issue licenses for houses of prostitution. Regulation and criminalization of prostitution raise different constitutional questions. Because the concern and
scope of this note is exclusively the criminal law, laws which regulate but do not proscribe
prostitution will not be considered.
"2State v. Fields, No. 72-4788 Cr. (3d Jud. Dist. Alas., June 27, 1973); United States
v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972); and State v. Woods,
No. 433012 (Minneapolis Mun. Ct., Dec. 21, 1971). For a thorough discussion of equal
protection arguments as a basis for the invalidation of prostitution laws, see Rosenbleet
& Pariente, The Prostitution of the Criminal Law, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 373 (1973).
'"Examples of such facially discriminatory laws are those held invalid in State v.
Fields, No. 72-4788 Cr. (3d Jud. Dist. Ct. Alas., June 27, 1973) and in State v. Woods,
No. 433012 (Minneapolis Mun. Ct., Dec. 21, 1971). ALASKA STAT. § 11.40.210 (1970) provided, "Prostitution includes the giving or receiving of the body by a female for sexual
intercourse for hire." MINNEAPOLIS ORD. 870.10 provided, "No female shall offer or submit
her body indiscriminately for sexual intercourse whether or not for a consideration."
"D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2701 (1967), which provided, "It shall not be lawful for any
person to invite, entice, persuade, or to address for the purpose of inviting, enticing or
persuading any person or persons sixteen years of age or over . . . for the purpose of
prostitution, or any other immoral or lewd purpose . . ."was found in United States v.
Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972), to be neutral on its face
but discriminatorily enforced against the female offender.
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tution laws. 1 5 While commercialized sex between unmarried
adults may eventually be included within the scope of the right
of privacy,"' it is doubtful that many courts will be willing to rest
the invalidation of laws criminalizing prostitution on this ground
in the near future. This is particularly true in light of the Supreme Court's recent obscenity decisions holding that an activity
which would be protected if indulged in within the privacy of
one's home will be accorded less protection in a commercial situation. 17
Right of privacy challenges, unlike equal protection challenges, would, if successful, result in total prohibition of laws
criminalizing prostitution. However, the usefulness of right of
privacy arguments for present challenges to prostitution laws is
limited by the as yet fairly narrow and undeveloped scope of the
right.'
C. Freedom of Speech
Statutes which proscribe solicitation for the purpose of prostitution have been attacked on the ground that they abridge the
"United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972)
slip op. at 31. The argument was raised in State v. Fields, No. 72-4788 Cr. (3d Jud. Dist.
Ct. Alas., June 27, 1973), but the equal protection issue was held to be dispositive of the
case and the right of privacy issue was not considered.
"Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) is a step in this direction. In upholding the
right of unmarried individuals to receive contraceptives, the Court stressed that the right
of privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) is not limited to the
marital relationship. 405 U.S. at 453.
"United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973); Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351,
354-55 (1971).
"The Supreme Court has recognized the right of privacy in matters relating to abortion (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); contraception (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)); marriage (Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)); family relationships (Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944)); and childrearing and education (Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)). For a discussion of post-Griswold federal
court decisions which address the ninth amendment, see Rhoades & Patula, The Ninth
Amendment: A Survey of Theory and Practicein the Federal Courts Since Griswold v.
Connecticut, 50 DENVER L.J. 153 (1973).
The now famous case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), has raised the question
whether invalidation of laws which contravene the right of privacy will be based on the
doctrine of substantive due process. Significant in this respect are the Court's words,
"This right of privacy, may it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or . . . in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people ....
" Id. at 153. One effect of a shift
to due process might well be abandonment of the need for showing a "compelling state
interest" and a lack of a "less restrictive alternative"; both must be shown under the ninth
amendment approach before the state can override the fundamental right involved. Under

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 51

first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.' 9 This claim
has much merit and chance of success in the three jurisdictions
which prohibit solicitation for prostitution but not prostitution
itself; 0 however, in those jurisdictions which define the act itself
as a crime and make solicitation to commit a crime a punishable
offense, the doctrine will be of little use.
None of the arguments currently utilized in framing challenges to the constitutionality of prostitution laws" address the
crucial issue in criminalization of prostitution. For whenever
state intrusion into the private lives of its citizens is accompanied
by potential imposition of the criminal sanction, questions of a
very peculiar nature must be asked.
II.
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Jerome Hall, one of the foremost scholars of criminal law,
divided propositions about criminal law into three categories:
principles, doctrines, and rules;2 2 those which are of the widest
generalization and universally applicable to all crimes are de23
nominated principles.
[Tihe principles of criminal law consist of seven ultimate notions
expressing: (1) mens rea, (2) act (effort), (3) the "concurrence" (fusion) of mens rea and act, (4) harm, (5) causation, (6) punishment,
a due process approach, a less stringent "balancing test" would likely
be substituted.
right is not
"The right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that ...
unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation." Id.
at 154.
"The claim was rejected in Cherry v. State, 18 Md. App. 252, 306 A.2d 634 (1973),
but was sustained in United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct.,
Nov. 3, 1972).
1"The District of Columbia, Michigan, and Nevada are the only jurisdictions which
prohibit solicitation for prostitution but not prostitution itself. Th relevant statutory
provisions are D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2701 (1967), held invalid in United States v. Moses,
Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972); MIcH. CoMp. LAWS
ANN. § 750.448 (1968), as amended, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.448 (1969); NEv. REV.
STAT. § 207.030(b) (1971).
"The cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment was asserted in
United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972), as a
basis for invalidating D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2701 (1967), which prohibits solicitation for
the purposes of prostitution. The court did not address the issue but rested its decision
on other grounds. In Ex parte Carey, 57 Cal. App. 297, 207 P. 271 (1922), the defendant
unsuccessfully raised the plea of cruel and unusual punishment in response to the imposition of an indeterminate sentence following her conviction for solicitation for prostitution.
For a discussion of the utility of the cruel and unusual punishment clause in framing
challenges to prostitution laws, see Rosenbleet & Pariente, supra note 12, at 379-80.
11J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 17 (2d ed. 1960).
"1Id. at 17, 22.
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and (7) legality .... [Tlhe principles of criminal law, excepting
. . . "punishment" and "legality" refer to essential elements of
"crime" ....

Unlike most of the above principles, which have been well
developed and well integrated into criminal theory, the principle
of harm has been largely ignored. The briefest examination of
American criminal law theory confirms the contention of the wellknown legal theorist G. 0. W. Mueller that "[t]he principle of
harm is the most underdeveloped concept in our criminal law.",,
In failing to take account of the principle of harm, American
jurisprudence has failed to recognize what should be one of the
primary limitations on the power of government to make conduct
criminal.
Perhaps the genesis of the problem can be traced to the extent to which framers of both state and federal constitutions concentrated on procedural safeguards, foregoing, for the most part,
specific substantive limitations on the kinds of conduct which
could be declared criminal." H. L. A. Hart points out that the
framers, in lieu of supplying substantive limitations, relied primarily on the legislature's sense of justice and, secondarily, on the
courts' use of due process to prevent an arbitrary application of
the criminal sanction when the legislature's sense of justice somehow went awry." It is debatable whether the reliance on the legislature or on the courts in this instance was more misplaced. Both
appear to have almost totally abrogated responsibility in first,
developing, and secondly, abiding by principles of criminal liability consonant with constitutional mandates. Hart summarizes
the problem:
Closely and vitally related to the failure of American courts to develop adequate principles of criminal liability . . .has been their
failure to come to grips with the underlying constitutional issues
involved. This failure is the more surprising because of the obvious
concern of the Constitution to safeguard the use of the method of
the criminal law-especially, but not exclusively, on the procedural
'Id. at 18.

' Mueller, Criminal Theory: An Appraisal of Jerome Hall's Studies in Jurisprudence
and Criminal Tneay, 34 IND. L.J. 206, 220 (1959).
2"Of ex post facto laws, an obvious exception, H.L.A. Hart says, "the principles of just
punishment implicit in such clauses have relevance in other situations than that only of
condemnation under an after-the-fact enactment-a wider relevance than courts have yet
recognized." Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 411 n.27
(1958).
"Id. at 411.
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side ....
What sense does it make to insist upon procedural safeguards in criminal prosecutions if anything whatever can be made
a crime in the first place?"

That one may not be deprived of "life, liberty, or property
without due process of law" has traditionally meant that one may
not be deprived arbitrarily of the same. Concern over arbitrariness explains the reverence with which the principle of legality is
viewed and the enshrined positions of the guarantees of notice
and trial by jury. But if no set principles are used in defining
criminal conduct, if criminality is determined solely by
undefinable, constantly changing public notions of morality, is
this not an arbitrary imposition of punishment and deprivation
of liberty without due process of law? As Justice Harlan wrote in
his dissent in Poe v. Ullman:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution ....
It
is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints .... 25

If due process is to have any meaning at all as a check on the
police power, its protection must extend to the very heart of the
criminal system and first and foremost provide constitutional
limits on what conduct may be declared criminal. If it is to be
no more than protection against arbitrary procedure in a system
whose prime characteristic is arbitrariness, it is a hollow guarantee indeed.
A. Morality: A Legitimate State Interest
Discussions of "victimless crimes" have traditionally been
carried on within the context of the age-old debate over the legitimacy and propriety of governmental regulation of morality. This
approach is both misleading and ineffective. It is misleading because it obscures the fact that the real issue is not regulation of
morality but criminalization of nonharmful conduct.3 0 It is inef"Id. at 430-31. Hart's thesis is that a sanction which imports blame is misused when
it is applied to conduct which is not blameworthy. Although he concerns himself with
conduct which is not blameworthy because the actor lacks a criminal state of mind, many
of his criticisms of the failure of American courts to develop adequate principles of criminal liability and to recognize and attempt to resolve the underlying constitutional issues
are directly applicable to the courts' treatment of conduct which is not blameworthy
because of the lack of any resultant objective harm.
"Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'""What truly distinguishes the offenses commonly thought of as 'against morals' is
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fective because, while the propriety of governmental regulation of
morality is a question which has been discussed, debated, and
disposed of by many legal philosophers, 3 the regulation of
morality as a component of the police power has been long accepted by American courts. 2 In the words of Eugene Rostow,
"Men often say that one cannot legislate morality. I should say
that we legislate hardly anything else." 33
The argument should not be that government should not
regulate morality, but rather that applications of the criminal law
should be restricted to that aspect of morality which concerns a
harm committed." This argument addresses the real issue: When
can the government's general authority to regulate morality be
exercised without transgressing constitutional norms? The answer should be that morals may be regulated by means of the
criminal sanction when, and only when, a breach of the moral
code would imminently cause a cognizable harm to a legally protected interest of another.
B. The Elements of Legal Harm
1. Invasion of a Legally Protected Interest
Upon first glance harm appears to be a normative concept,
neither lending itself to legal analysis nor to a systematized application within a legal context. Indeed, few legal theorists have
ventured to define the term.
Hall and Mueller have defined harm as implying "interests
or values which have been destroyed, wholly or in part,"" and as
"the violation of [an] intangible, legally protected interest
. The latter definition is preferable because of the impornot their relation to morality but the absence of ordinary justification for punishment by
a nontheocratic state." Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM.
L. REV. 669 (1963).
:"See P. DEAIIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965); L. FULLER. THE MORALITY OF
LAW (1969); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630 (1958); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593 (1958); Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1967).
"Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905); Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97
U.S. 25, 33 (1877). But see United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
535 n.7 (1973).

:'Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 18 CAMB. L.J. 174, 197 (1960).
"Comment, Private ConsensualAdult Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to Others
in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 581, 582 (1967). See J. HAILL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL. LAW 158 (1947 ed.).
"J. HAI.L & G. MUELLER. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 90 (2d ed. 1965).
:16Id.
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tance of limiting definitions of harm to the destruction in whole
or in part of legally protected37 interests. By so limiting its meaning, harm becomes a workable, legally significant concept, removed from the normative, subjective sphere. It makes clear that
in analyzing the external effect of a legally prohibited act, the
harm requirement will not be fulfilled merely by asserting that
the effect is in some way undesirable to some individual or individuals. The harm requirement is only satisfied when legally protected interests have been infringed. The determination of which
interests are to be given legal protection is one made continuously
both by the courts, and the legislatures.
2. Harm to Others
John Stuart Mill once wrote:
[Tihe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
sufficient warrant.u

His words have sparked much heated debate; the sides have been
chosen and the battlelines formed." The issue, however, should
not be decided in the abstract according to one's philosophical
disposition, but rather by rigorous adherence to legal analysis.
Within the framework of the principle of harm there are two
separate issues: (1) Can the harm requirement be satisfied if the
only injury resulting from a given act is to the individual
performing the act? and (2) Is all harm to others punishable?
The answer to the former question turns upon whether one
has any interests which are legally protected against infringement
by oneself. Laws making it a crime to commit suicide are the most
obvious example of laws which implicitly assert that one's interests (i.e., in life) are protected from such infringement.
If one accepts the basic premise that the sole purpose of
according legal protection to various interests is to provide sanctions for unwanted interference with those interests, the faulty
logic of maintaining that one has interests which are legally protected against infringement by oneself is easily highlighted. By
: See generally Eser, The Principleof "Harm" in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQUESNE U.L. REV. 345 (196566).
:,J. MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANIsM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
95-96 (1951).
'See note 31 supra.
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definition whenever the interference with one's interests stems
from an act which one performs oneself, the interference is not
unwanted. Since there can be no harm without interference with
legally protected interests, the harm requirement can never be
fulfilled outside of the context of harm to others.
Generally courts avoid having to rule on the constitutionality
of legislation which has as its only purpose the protection of the
individual from himself by holding that the statute challenged on
this ground does in fact cause harm to others.4 0 However, as H.
L. Packer has pointed out, "The question is one of the remoteness
and probability of the harm."'" Therefore, the second issue, what
harm to others is punishable, must be resolved by considering the
requirement of imminence set forth below.42
3. Factually Demonstrable Harm
One of the most important criteria which must be met before
harm can appropriately be subjected to the criminal sanction is
that harm must be harm in fact. Given the courts' failure to
recognize and require harm as an element of every crime, it is not
surprising the extent to which they have been willing, when they
have considered harm at all, to satisfy themselves with mere
3
4
presumptions of harm .

"'People v. Schmidt, 54 Misc. 2d 702, 283 N.Y.S.2d 290, 292 (Erie County Ct. 1967);
People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799-800 (City Ct. Buffalo 1967);
State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 104 R.I. 28, 31, 241 A.2d 625, 627 (1968).
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968) is
one of the few cases which held that a criminal statute whose only purpose is to protect
the individual from himself is unconstitutional. The court struck down a statute requiring
motorcyclists to wear crash helmets on the grounds that it violated the due process, equal
protection, and right of privacy protections of the ninth and fourteenth amendments. The
court's response to the attorney general's contention that the state has an interest in the
viability of its citizens and can legislate to keep them healthy and self-supporting was that
"this logic could lead to unlimited paternalism." Id. at 75.
"H. PACKER, supra note 5, at 266.
2
See text accompanying notes 56-58 infra.
"In Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1956), where the defendant was
prosecuted for assault after he touched a policeman's genitals, the victim denied any
emotional injury. However, the court said that no specific proof of emotional injury was
required. " llt would seem that a sexual touching is a sufficiently offensive act to constitute an assault. Nor should the fact that an experienced policeman denies emotional
injury alter the situation." Id. at 580. But see Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 243
N.E.2d 898 (1969), where the defendants challenged their convictions for unlawful possession of marijuana on due process grounds, asserting that the law was irrational and
unreasonable because there was no evidence that marijuana endangered the health,
safety, welfare, or morals of the community. In reaching its conclusion that the statute
was reasonable the court found "harm" by examining the results of several scientific
studies. Id. at 194 nn.1I & 12, 243 N.E.2d at 903 nn. 11 & 12. It is important to note that
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Of those jurists who have concerned themselves with the
principle of harm, Orville Snyder has been the most adamant
about the need for factual harm:
The principle, "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," that only
conduct causing or threatening public harm can be made a crime
and that public harm is a matter of fact, which must be susceptible
of factual demonstration, is the fundamental limitation on legislative power and of the essence of law as a means of protecting freedom. While it is not the function of the courts to second-guess legislatures on the wisdom of making or not making conduct in fact
harmful a crime, the question of whether conduct is or is not harmful
in fact . . . is open . . . . The answer is not to be extracted from
the exegesis of an abstract morality, from social-welfare generalities
• . . nor is the touchstone . . . what public opinion demands. The
answer is to be found in a public evidential inquiry into such matters
as, What and who are affected? How are they affected? To what
extent are they affected? In what is this harmful? How is this a
public harm?"

Snyder's admonititions aside, factual establishment of the
presence or absence of harm is admittedly difficult because of the
very definition of harm, the impairment of legally protected interests or values. Interests and values are, by their nature, often
intangible, and the measurement of their infringement or destruction not susceptible to quantification. However, to accept
Hall's premise that harm in those crimes where there is no
physical injury (e.g., libel, kidnapping, perjury) may be stated in
terms of intangibles such as harm to reputation, public safety, or
institutions' 5 is not to say that there is no necessity for factual
proof in such situations.
Who has the burden of proving the existence or nonexistence
of factual harm? Given the lattitude accorded the legislature in
its exercises of the police power, the answer is fairly clear. The
judgments of the legislature enjoy a presumption of constitutionality even though unsupported by evidence, and the burden of
proof generally falls on the challenger. 6 Evidence on the record
supporting a particular provision is not a condition precedent to
the courts' upholding it upon challenge. However, while the burthe court chose to focus on those studies which did support the allegation of harm to the

public health, rather than simply to hold that a showing of harm was not necessary to
support the provision.
SNYDER, AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 764 (1953).
"J. HALL, supra note 22, at 217.
"United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
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den of proof would remain on the challenger, a showing of a lack
of factual harm should result in mandatory invalidation of the
provision.
4. Imminent Harm
It must be emphasized that it will often be possible to find
some harm, some infringement of a legally protected interest,
which if traced back far enough can be found to originate with a
given act. Thus discussions of harm should not be carried on in
terms of a sharp dichotomy-harm or no harm.47 The issue is
whether the harm in question is a proper subject of the criminal
law. The resolution of this issue involves a great interplay between Hall's principles of harm and causation."
Harm to others may be one of two kinds-direct or indirect.
The former is always punishable; the latter may or may not be.
What is needed is a principle to separate punishable from nonpunishable indirect harm-a principle which could provide a
consistent, nonarbitrarytest, whose operation would meet the
due process requirements of rationality and regularity in the application of the laws. That the proximity of an act to its resultant
harm is the crucial criterion in separating punishable from nonpunishable harm is shown by an examination of attempt law.
a. Attempt Law
The problems and issues of attempt law are a microcosm of
the problems and issues involved in the principle of harm. According to Hall, the doctrine of criminal attempt represents "a
major explication of the fundamental principle stipulating the
commission of external harm."4 9
The presence and the nature of the harm in inchoate offenses
such as attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, and possession of burglar's tools, has been a matter of much debate.w If it is said that
such offenses contain no harm, the basis for infliction of punishment must be the moral culpability of the actor. But if moral
culpability of the actor as evidenced in crime-directed behavior
suffices, why the emphasis in attempt law to distinguish between
states of preparation, which are held to be nonpunishable, and
attempts, which are held to be punishable? In both instances
equivalent moral culpability and antisocial behavior can be
found.
"7 Hall, Perennial Problems of the CriminalLaw, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 15, 23 (1973).
"See note 24 supra.
"J. HALL, supra note 34, at 95-96.
"'J.HALL, supra note 22, at 217-18 & n.18.
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If all conduct "in the direction" of certain harms were penalized, the
. . . problem would disappear. But only the criminal attempt, not
the preparation, is punishable. The plain implication of that must
be explored.5 '

The remoteness or proximity of the harm from the actor's
conduct is the distinguishing element between preparation and
attempt in both case law52 and statutory codifications." For the
defendant to be liable for attempt there "must be a dangerous
proximity to success" 54 or "an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culmimate in [the
actor's] commission of the crime."5 5 Attempt law, then, separates those harms which are punishable from those which are not
by examining the attenuation of the relationship between the act
and its resulting harm, by asking the question, "How far removed
from the act or tangentially connected to the act is the harm in
question?"
b. The Test of Imminence
A criterion similar to that applied in attempt law to distinguish culpable from nonculpable conduct should be applied to
other determinations of criminal liability. A principle
conveniently termed "imminence" would (1) accurately represent criteria considered in imposition of liability for attempt, a
major area of the law where the harm is intangible, and (2) serve
a function in determinations of criminal liability analogous to
that of proximate cause in determinations of civil liability.
The imminence principle would focus attention on the question, "Is the harm imminently forthcoming from the act?" Application of the principle would answer the crucial question, "Is the
harm involved of a nature which should be subject to criminal
sanctions or is it too removed in time and space from the act
engendering it?"
The answer to the latter question is, of course, ultimately a
policy determination, as are proximate cause determinations in
"J. HALL, supra note 34, at 101.
-21n Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48 N.E. 770 (1897), Justice Holmes
said for the court, "As the aim of the law is not to punish sins, but is to prevent certain
external results, the act done must come pretty near to accomplishing that result before
the law will notice it." Id. at 20, 48 N.E. at 770.
"'"A person commits criminal attempt if ...
he intentionally engages in conduct
constituting a substantial step toward commission of the offense." COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40-2-101 (Supp. 1971), amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-25-1 (1963).
"'Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
"'MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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civil liability. Of importance here, however, is that proximate
cause determinations have been the task of the courts; the imminence principle also envisions active participation of the courts
in deciding what conduct should be made criminal-an all too
new role.
What should the test of imminence be? It is not necessary nor
even desirable that the test be narrowly drawn; it must be flexible
and capable of application in a wide variety of circumstances. It
is significant that the guidelines for proximate cause determinations of civil liability have been drawn in such a way as to give
5
the courts wide latitude.
A test which is reflective of the above considerations and
which would at once provide the courts with the necessary guidelines, yet leave them free to make independent determinations
based on the merits of the individual case, is, "Is there a direct
and causal sequence between the act and the resulting harm,
such that the chain of causation can be perceived and evaluated,
and the harm determined thereby not to be too remote nor the
relationship between the act and the harm too attenuated?" The
crucial part of the test is that there be a perceivable chain of
causation. If the chain must be assumed, liability cannot attach.
Having posited the imminence principle as a workable criterion for distinguishing punishable from nonpunishable harm, a
test of its general applicability is in order. For purposes of analysis crimes can be separated into two broad categories: (1) resultoriented crimes, where the act prohibited is itself the harm to be
prevented, and (2) simple conduct crimes. With crimes of the first
category application of the principle is easy. By definition, once
the elements of the crime are satisfied, the harm has occurred.
For example, "[a] person is guilty of criminal homicide if he...
causes the death of another human being."57 The act (causing
death) is contemporaneous with the specific harm (interference
with the interest in life). Thus result-oriented crimes contain a
built-in satisfaction of the imminence requirement.
In the second category of cases, where the conduct prohibited
is not itself the harm to be prevented, each crime must be individually examined to ascertain whether or not harm is imminently
forthcoming from the prohibited act. A simple chart demonstrates that even where the harm sought to be prevented is intan'See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
"'MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962").
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gible, penal codes by and large restrict liability to instances where
the harm is imminent:
Crime
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Imminent Harm

perjury
libel
treason
assault
bribery

obstruction of justice
harm to reputation
overthrow of state 5
psychic harm, apprehension
corruption of public officers

A glaring exception to this general rule is crimes commonly
termed "crimes against morals." Such crimes represent a sphere
where none of the usual principles of criminal liability are applied
and where none of the usual considerations which result in making conduct criminal are present.

III.

THE HARM IN PROSTITUTION

Having established the fundamental nature of the principle
of harm and that harm should be an essential element of every
crime, the question, "What is the harm in prostitution?" will now
be explored. The asserted harms in prostitution will be examined
in light of the principle that for conduct to be punishable, it must
satisfy the four elements of legal harm: (1) a factually demonstrable (2) invasion of a legally protected interest (3) of another (4)
imminently caused by the conduct.
The harms which are alleged to be caused by prostitution
and thereby justify its prohibition are: (1) prostitution provides
an opportunity for the commission of crimes which may be ancillary to prostitution; (2) prostitution provides a breeding ground
for the activities of organized crime; (3) prostitution is a significant factor in the spread of venereal disease; (4) prostitution
results in the subjection of citizens to offensive public
solicitation; and (5) prostitution contributes to the destruction of
public morals.
A. Opportunitiesfor Commission of Ancillary Crimes
Does the act or practice of prostitution imminently cause
harm in fact by providing an increased opportunity for the
commission of other crimes? It is often argued that prostitution
should be suppressed because its commission is inevitably connected with the commission of other crimes such as beatings and
"Note the imminence requirement built into the crime of treason by the requirement
of an overt act. U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 3.
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theft. The first step in the analysis is the determination of the
presence or absence of a legally protected interest to serve as the
basis of harm. Arguably, a legally protected interest is present in
the form of the general security of the community; no doubt
concern for the general security underlies every criminal prohibition, each of which protects the general security from destruction
in a specific way.
Although a legally protected interest is perhaps present, the
cause in fact requirement is unsatisfied. There is nothing about
an act of intercourse for hire which in itself makes the commission
of other crimes likely. The harm embodied in the ancillary crimes
is a byproduct of the environment to which society consigns
prostitution, not a harm caused by that conduct itself. The irrationality of criminalizing prostitution to decrease theft or assault
is obvious if one realizes that it is precisely because prostitution
is criminalized that such crimes are not reported when committed
within the context of prostitution.59 If anything, then, criminalization of prostitution serves as an incentive and shield for the
would-be thief or assailant. Armed with the knowledge that his
or her victim will be reluctant to report the illegal incident, the
actor, whether the patron or the prostitute, is encouraged rather
than deterred.
More basically, there may be a limit on the extent to which
a state may proscribe one kind of conduct with the purpose of
eradicating a different kind of conduct. In Stanley v. Georgia"'the
Supreme Court found an overstepping of that limit by the state
legislature and held:
[The legislature] may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene
matter on the ground that it may lead to anti-social conduct than
it may prohibit the possession of chemistry books on the ground that
they may lead to the manufacture of home-made spirits."

In holding invalid their respective prostitution laws, both the
Washington, D.C., Superior Court in United States v. Moses"2
3 examined the
and an Alaska district court in State v. Fields"
ancillary crimes argument. Both courts, in finding the harm not
"James & Burnstin, Prostitutionin Seattle, 6 WASH. STATE BAR
1971).
"394 U.S. 557 (1969).
"Id. at 567.
2
Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972).
3
" No. 72-4788 Cr. (3d Jud. Dist. Ct. Alas., June 27, 1973).
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only unsubstantiated but also unsound constitutionally as a basis
for criminalization, cited Stanley. The court in Fields said:
[Pirosecution of future criminality presumed to be associated with
certain types of offenses or offenders may not only have little empirical support, but is incompatible with our constitutional system of
due process and equal protection of the laws. 4

And in Moses the court said:
If indeed there is evidence that prostitution is sometimes coincident
with certain crimes, there is also ample indication that the extension
of the criminal law to soliciting significantly hinders application of
legal sanctions to those very crimes. By the most fundamental precepts of our law, it is to those violent acts that such sanctions must
directly be addressed. Endorsement of an alleged state interest
which precisely inverts this proscriptive emphasis would be a
perversion of justice . . ..

B.

The Encouragement of Organized Crime
Does the act or practice of prostitution imminently cause
harm in fact by providing a breeding ground for the activities of
organized crime? The drafters of the Model Penal Code seriously
considered following Britain's example of decriminalizing prostitution and retaining only public solicitation as a crime; one of the
determinative factors in their decision not to do so was the belief
that "call-houses" were an important part of the financial machine of the underworld and closely linked to "rackets" such as
narcotics."
This contention has much in common with the previously
discussed assertion that prostitution causes an increased opportunity for the commission of other crimes. The allegation that
prostitution provides a breeding ground for the activities of organized crime may, like the allegation that prostitution results in
an increase in other crimes, confuse the effects of prostitution
with those of illegalized prostitution. The San Francisco Committee on Crime has stated that "[i]t is

.

.

.probable that if prosti-

tution were not a crime, it would not be organized." 67
Even assuming that the presence of organized crime in a
given activity is not a function of the illegality of the activity, the
"Id., slip op. at 9.
"United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972),
slip op. at 22.
"Schwartz, supra note 30, at 682.
"THE SAN FRANCISCO COMMITTEE ON CRIME, A REPORT ON NoN-VICTIM CRIME IN SAN
FRANCISCO 32 (1971).
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harm requirement is still not met because invasion of the interest
in the general security through encouragement of organized crime
can be factually rebutted. The President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice reported in 1967 that
the role of organized crime in prostitution is both small and declining" and its findings have been corroborated by two other
,recent studies. 9 Significantly, the drafters of the Model Penal
Code formulated their position without the benefit of the above
information-all three studies were published after the completion of the Proposed Official Draft in 1962.0
In conclusion, the assertion that prostitution causes harm by
providing a breeding ground for organized crime fails to satisfy
that element of legal harm of a factually demonstrable invasion
of a legally protected interest. Not only can it not be factually
established that prostitution itself and not illegalized prostitution
is tied to organized crime, but the presence of organized crime
cannot be factually established at all. On the contrary, a substantial body of evidence tends to disprove its presence.
C. Transmission of Venereal Disease
Does the act or practice of prostitution imminently cause
harm in fact by the transmission of venereal disease? Such a
contention has been a continuously proffered justification for
criminalization of prostitution." The community no doubt has
"PRESIDENr'S

COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE

CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 189 (1967).

"Sherwin & Winick, Debate: Should Prostitution Be Legalized?, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR,
Jan. 71972, at 72; Esselstyn, Prostitutionin the United States, 376 ANNALS 123, 127 (1968).
"The court in Moses took judicial notice of the reports cited in notes 67-69 supra in
holding the possible connection of organized crime with prostitution insufficient to justify
an invasion of the defendants' rights of privacy and freedom of speech through prohibition
of solicitation for prostitution. After citing yet another study which heralded the decline
of prostitution as an underworld activity and also highlighted underworld involvement in
more profitable activities such as labor control (DAvIS, Prostitution, in CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 262 (1961)), the court said:
While this Court naturally expresses no view on the relationship of organized
crime with organized labor, it is a conceivable affiliation no less logically
plausible than that of organized crime and prostitution. However, one would
expect to find few serious proponents of the abolition of labor unions in order
to prevent their potential domination by criminal syndicates. Courts have,
in fact, long held that society should regulate illegal conduct directly, rather
than prohibit other activities on the ground that those activities are somehow, in some cases, connected with illegality.
United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972), slip
op. at 19.
7
'J. WARREN, THIRTY YEARS' BATTLE WITH CRIME 141-42 (1875); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 207.12, Comment at 171-75 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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a legally protected interest in the state of its health; protection
of "the general health, safety, and welfare" has long been recognized as a component of the police power.7" Analysis can proceed
to whether or not such interest is in fact invaded by prostitution.
In reaching its decision to retain prostitution as a crime in
the Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute put considerable weight on the alleged impairment of community health
caused by prostitution.73 However, in arriving at their conclusions
that "[p]rostitution is an important source of venereal disease"7 4
and that "non-commercial 'promiscuity' appears to be less dangerous [in this respect] than commercial prostitution" the Institute relied upon data gathered from studies conducted three
decades ago on the causes of venereal disease in army populations.7"
Fortunately more recent and representative data are available. An extensive 3-year study in Seattle, Washington, based in
part upon a medical examination of every prostitute arrested,
found syphilis to be almost nonexistent among prostitutes and
the rate of gonorrhea to be between 5 and 6 percent.7 7 The Public
Health Service of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare found that of over 13,600 females diagnosed with infectious
syphilis, less than 3 percent were prostitutes."
Two other sources suggest a relatively constant rate of venereal disease among prostitutes of less than 5 percent.7" Furthermore, as the court in Moses noted, the conclusions of experts that
there is no significant link between prostitution and the spread
of venereal disease may easily be corroborated inferentially: while
the 15 to 30-year-old age group accounts for 84 percent of all
reported cases of venereal disease, the 30 to 60-year-old age group
accounts for 70 percent of all visits to prostitutes. 0
71"'According to settled principles the police power of a State must be held to embrace,
at least, such reasonable regulations . . . as will protect the public health and the public
safety." Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1904).
7:MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.12, Comment at 171-75 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
7
'Id. at 171.
"I!d. at 175.
71ld.
at 171 n.10, 173 n.20, 174 n.21.
77James & Burstin, supra note 59, at 9.
7
'United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972),

slip op. at 15, citing DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE,

per J. Millar, M.D., Chief, Veneral Disease Branch, Center for Disease Control, Atlanta,
Ga. (June 1,1972).
7"Sherwin & Winick, supra note 69; Honolulu Star Bulletin, Mar. 23, 1972, at B-8.
"James & Burstin, supra note 59, at 8.
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What conclusions can be drawn from the above data? First,
because the incidence of venereal disease among prostitutes is
approximately 5 percent, it can be assumed that approximately
5 percent of all persons who patronize prostitutes will thereby
acquire venereal disease. But is a legally protected interest of a
patron invaded by the acquisition of venereal disease from a consensual act of intercourse? This question must be answered in the
negative because, as previously established, the harm requirement cannot be satisfied if the only injury resulting from a given
act is to the individual performing that act.
However, the possibility exists that the patron who acquires
venereal disease from a prostitute will transmit that disease to
another, who may in turn transmit it to another, and so on. While
at no point will there be legally cognizable harm to any individuals who acquire venereal disease from a consensual act of intercourse, at some point the contagion may reach a dimension where
it can be said to invade the broad interest in community health.
Does the prostitute who infects a patron who in turn infects
other members of the community cause harm to the interest in
community health? The existence of venereal disease can be factually demonstrated and its widespread existence invades a legally protected interest. Therefore only one element of legal harm
still remains to be fulfilled: Is the invasion of the interest imminently forthcoming from the act?
There is a perceivable chain of causation, composed of a
series of acts of intercourse, between the act by which the patron
was first infected and the ensuing infection of numerous members
of the community-which widespread infection constitutes the
harm. Thus it could be maintained that the prostitute who infected the patron, who in turn transmitted the disease to other
members of the community, caused harm to the interest in community health. But it could just as logically be maintained that
the patron who first transmitted venereal disease to the prostitute, who transmitted it to a patron, who in turn transmitted it
to other members of the community, caused the harm to the
interest in community health. With whom should the chain of
causation be said to originate?
Is there validity to the argument that the harm should be
attributed to prostitutes as a matter of policy-on the grounds
that they account for a great volume of indiscriminate sexual
activity? The problem with this argument is that it fails to focus
accurately on the harm involved. The harm is widespread vener-
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eal disease and it is caused by indiscriminate sexual activity by
one who has venereal disease. Even if it is conceded that prostitutes may contribute more than their proportional share to the
spread of venereal disease, the fact remains that they only cause
a very small fraction-approximately 5 percent-of all venereal
disease.
Therefore,a criminal provision which prohibits all prostitution in order to prevent the harm of venereal disease bears no
reasonable relation to the end it is designed to serve, and consequently is an invalid exercise of the police power. The Supreme
Court stated long ago:
The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled
by mere pretenses. They are at liberty-indeed, are under a solemn
duty-to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon
the inquiry whether the Legislature has transcended the limits of its
authority. If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted
to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety,
has no real or substantial relation to those objects . . . it is the duty
of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.",

Most importantly for purposes of a harm analysis, the finding that provisions criminalizing prostitution bear no substantial
relationship to the object they are designed to protect-community health-means that although there may be a
perceivable chain of causation between the prohibited conduct
and some resulting harm, the relationship between the act and
the resulting harm is too attenuated to fulfill the imminence requirement.
The harm alleged to be caused by prostitution to community
health fails to satisfy the criteria of legal harm and thus fails to
provide the necessary justification for criminalization.
D. Subjection of Citizens to Offensive Solicitation
Does the act or practice of prostitution imminently cause
harm in fact by the subjection of citizens to offensive public solicitation? The determination of harm in this instance is a matter
of some difficulty since it is unclear whether or not a legally
protected interest is involved. The issue is twofold: first, whether
the public's sensibilities are ever a legally protected interest; and
secondly, even if they are sometimes legally protected, whether
I'Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
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or not they are protected when the only interference stems not
from acts, but speech.
That the public's sensibilities receive some protection may
be shown by an examination of the internal division of penal
codes. Such crimes as prostitution, open lewdness, and
disseminating obscene materials are often subsumed under the
appellation "Public Indecency." 2 The crime of open lewdness is
based squarely on protection of the sensibilities of others; statutes
prohibiting open lewdness make it a crime to do "any lewd act
which [the actor] knows is likely to be observed by others who
would be affronted or alarmed." 83
Despite consensus on the permissibility of protecting public
sensibilities from offensive acts, first amendment issues arise
when protection is attempted to be invoked against offensive
speech. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the right of
an individual to be shielded from speech which he may deem
offensive is severely limited by the right of others to enjoy the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the first amendment."4
But even assuming that public sensibilities are a legally protected interest and that offensive public solicitation for the purposes of prostitution causes an invasion of that interest, the issue
remains whether the practice of prostitution is the cause in fact
of the harm which results from such solicitation. The answer is
that it is not the cause in fact. Publicly soliciting customers for
one's business is by no means an intrinsic part of doing business;
were prostitution not illegal, the multifarious mechanisms for
procuring business available to the average commercial enterprise would likewise be available to prostitutes. Great Britain has
recognized the separability of prostitution and solicitation for
prostitution and deals with whatever problems are caused by the
latter directly. It continues to apply criminal sanctions to offensive public solicitation while preserving the noncriminal status of
prostitution itselr 5 in keeping with the recommendations of the
8 that private sexual
Wolfenden Report"
behavior between consenting adults should not be criminalized.
art. 251 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
93!d. § 251.1.
"'Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
'"Street Offenses Act, 7 & 8 ELIZ. 2, c. 57 (1959).
"MODEL PENAL CODE,

"COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, REPORT,

25 (1957).

CMND No. 247 at
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Because prostitution and public solicitation for prostitution
are separate and severable, the harms occasioned by the latter
should not be attributed to the former. No invasion of the interest
denominated the public's sensibilities is caused by prostitution
itself; therefore, this asserted harm cannot serve as a basis for
criminalization of prostitution, but only for criminalization of
offensive public solicitation.
A statute which prohibited all public solicitation, whether or
not offensive, would not only encounter serious first amendment
problems,8 7 but would suffer from the defect of not satisfying the
requirements of legal harm. Statutory prohibitions of solicitation
should be drafted to incorporate the requirement that to be punishable, solicitation must in fact invade the public sensibilities.
Furthermore, "[i]n order to curb effectively the use of undesirable police techniques, it might also be desirable to provide that a
conviction for public solicitation should require evidence that the
person solicited was offended thereby .... "88
Under such a statute, 89 present enforcement practices for
prostitution could not continue. Unlike the majority of offenses
which involve a complaint by a harmed citizen, "morals offenses"
are enforced by the costly practice 0 of police posing as potential
customers; "[i]n these cases, the policemen holding themselves
out as potential customers seeking solicitation can scarcely claim
to have been offended or harrassed [sic] by any conversation
their subterfuge elicited."'"
An alternative method of dealing with harm caused by offensive public solicitation is through presently existing breach of the
peace or disorderly conduct statutes. The court in Moses suggests
this approach.9" Statutes or ordinances which
1 United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct.,
Nov. 3, 1972),
slip op. at 24-26.
"RH. PACKER, supra note 5, at 331.

"Such a statute could be worded:
A person commits an offense if he addresses another in a manner designed
to, or likely to, and which does offend that other, for the purpose of engaging
that other in a sexual act for hire.
"'A publication prepared by the Alliance for a Safer New York suggests that present
enforcement practices of prostitution laws result in a yearly loss to the nation of $10
million. "On a per case basis it is one of the most expensive non-victim crimes to 'control.'
San Francisco estimates run to about $270,000 a year, or $175 per arrest." ALLIANCE FOR A
SAFER NEW YORK, CRIMES WITH No VICTIMS 35 (1972).
"United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972),
slip op.
at 23.
2
1 1d. at 25.
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make it unlawful to provoke a breach of the peace by acting in a
manner as to annoy, disturb, obstruct or be offensive to others,
[focus] narrowly on the problem of the individual grievously offended by certain language. . . . [An] advantage of this or some
alternative "disorderly conduct" statute is that ... the individual
citizen as complainant ascertains the offense, rather than . . . a
police officer . . . whose quality of performance is measured by the
number of successful prosecutions flowing from his efforts."3

In summary, the allegation that the practice of prostitution
causes harm by subjecting citizens to offensive public solicitation
is unfounded in that prostitution is distinct from solicitation and
is not the cause in fact of whatever impairment of legally
protected interests is caused by the latter. While some solicitation for prostitution may be criminally prohibited, the principle
of harm requires that the criminal prohibition include only that
solicitation which causes an invasion of the legally protected interest of the public's sensibilities.
E. Destruction of Morals
Does the act or practice of prostitution imminently cause
harm in fact by contributing to the destruction of morals? Of all
the harms alleged to be caused by prostitution, this requires the
most careful scrutiny. Not only is it probable that this alleged
harm is foremost in the minds of those who advocate criminalization of prostitution,94 but it is a "harm" which is inevitably approached and analyzed incorrectly. The court's treatment of this
alleged harm in Moses is illustrative of the problem; although it
recognized the primacy of the alleged harm in the mind of the
legislature, it phrased the issue in misleading and ultimately ineffectual terms:
The inordinate overextension of this statute, so disproportional with
any of the potential evils occasioned by solicitation for prostitution,
contributes to the inevitable deduction that the government's primary concern here is to suppress prostitution because it is "immoral." Having reached what this Court believes to be the central, if
tacit, state interest in these cases, it must now consider the broad
question of the right of government to regulate morality."

As emphasized above,9" the real issue is not whether, but
9:11d.

§ 207.12, Comment at 171 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
"United States v. Moses, Nos. 17778-72 & 21346-72 (D.C. Super. Ct., Nov. 3, 1972),
slip op. at 28.
"See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra,
"MODEL PENAL CODE
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when, government may regulate morality. Because of the many
instances in which morals receive, if not direct protection, at least
indirect protection through the overlap of moral and legal
prohibitions (e.g., prohibitions against taking the life of another),
this analysis will presume morality to be a legally protected interest. Attention will be focused on the issue of whether or not prostitution imminently causes a factually demonstrable invasion of
that interest.
The first obstacle to resolution of this issue is the difficulty
of determining exactly what constitutes the interest. It begs the
question merely to assert that "morals" means the public morals 7-whose morals are to be the standard? In In re Davis98 a
California court struggled with a similar issue in reviewing a conviction under a statute which made it a crime "wilfully and
wrongfully" to commit any act "which openly outrages public
decency." 9 9 In attempting to decide what constitutes a violation
of "public decency" the court asked:
"[Wiho is the public?" . . . That answer is a great deal easier to
give in a homogeneous society, in times of well established precepts
of morality and manners, such as Victorian England, than today
....
When the statute speaks of "public decency" does it presuppose some kind of consensus among the majority of the public as to
what is and what is not "decent" and, if that assumption is wrong,
to which segment of the public is the trier to look?' ®

In a complex and pluralistic urban society a term as amorphous
as morals cannot easily be ascribed meaning.
Even if one uses as the standard whatever the majority,
through the medium of the penal code, says the public morals are,
the problem remains to determine when those morals have been
destroyed, wholly or in part, by a given act. To maintain that
harm may be presumed from the simple act of disobedience of the
mandate would be to ignore an essential element of legal
harm-that it be factually demonstrable.
Does prostitution, as is frequently maintained, in some manner cause a public harm? The danger of an allegation of "public
harm" is that it often serves as "an intellectual smokescreen hiding a lack of analysis."'"' "Society has no interests over and above
"7Comment, supra note 34, at 582 n.4.
"242 Cal. App. 2d 645, 51 Cal. Rptr. 702 (Cal. App. 1966), vacated, 245 Cal. App. 2d
376, 53 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1966).
"CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 6501/2 (West 1970).

'"242 Cal. App. 2d 645, 652, 51 Cal. Rptr. 702, 706-07 (Cal. App. 1966).
'"'Comment, supra note 34, at 592.
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the interests of its constituent members. To say that society is
harmed can only mean that some number of individuals are
harmed."""2 Therefore, in every allegation of a public harm there
must be some ascertainable member or members of the public
who are harmed. Asserting the existence of a public harm thus
does not destroy the need to demonstate factually who is harmed
and in what manner.
In this case it is impossible to identify an effect on anyone's
morals except possibly those of the participants. But can the
morals of the participants be legally harmed? The requirement
of harm to others necessitates answering this question in the negative. The morals of the participants are not interests which are
legally protected against actions taken by themselves.
It can be seen that attempts to establish harm by destruction
or impairment of the interest denominated "general morals" are
deficient by virtue of an inability to establish a factually demonstrable invasion of a legally protected interest. However, this
is not the only weakness in the argument that deviation from
community notions of morality results in destruction of public
morals. The question which highlights the most fallible point in
such an argument is, assuming that there is harm, "Is harm imminently forthcoming from the act?"
Applying the test, "Is there a direct and causal sequence
between the act and the resulting harm, such that the chain of
causation can be perceived and evaluated, and the harm thereby
determined not to be too remote nor the relationship between the
act and the harm too attenuated?" to the alleged harm, no chain
of causation between the act of intercourse and the destruction
of general morals can be perceived. And, as established above, if
the chain of causation is so attenuated that it must be assumed,
liability cannot attach.
The harm to morals alleged to be caused by the practice of
prostitution fails to meet the requirements of legal harm in two
major respects: (1) there is no factually demonstrable invasion of
a legally protected interest; and (2) even if the assumption is
made that the practice of prostitution affects the community's
interest in general morals, the alleged harm is not imminently
forthcoming from the act, but rather is remote and only tangentially connected thereto. Therefore, the harm to morals alleged to
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result from the practice of prostitution fails and criminal liability
cannot be imposed.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps in a country as prone to examine its criminal doctrine as its constitutional doctrine-and to examine the former
within the context of the latter-the crime of prostitution would
long ago have been eliminated. Application of the principle of
harm to the criminalization of prostitution demonstrates that
none of the harms alleged to be caused by prostitution meet the
criteria of legal harm. A rigorous adherence to the principle of
harm would achieve both a reconciliation of prostitution with
fundamental principles of criminal liability and a greater harmony of constitutional and criminal doctrines.
It is entirely too easy to forget that American pride in having
a government of laws and not of men is a sham if those laws are
not founded on reason, sound principles of liability, and, ultimately, the Constitution itself. Recognition and application of
the principle of harm would bring the body of criminal law back
into concord with the most fundamental of constitutional
mandates-that one may not arbitrarilybe deprived of life, liberty, or property. A criminal code which ignores this fundamental
precept, which makes nonharmful conduct criminal, should not
be allowed to stand. It is the duty and responsibility of the courts
to ensure that such codes do not stand and their acceptance of
this responsibility has been too long delayed.
The historic concern of American courts to provide procedural safeguards for those threatened with loss of their liberty is
laudable. It is not enough. If the full scope of liberty guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment is to be realized, the courts must
recognize that due process of law is properly a safeguard of not
only the procedure, but also the substance of the criminal law.
Madeline S. Caughey

